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Nitish Kumar came to power in the politically unstable state of Bihar in November 2005, 
and has remained there for nearly 15 years (with a 9-month interruption). His tenure as 
Chief Minister of Bihar is quite remarkable, given that a large majority of chief 
ministers in India tend to not hold office for so long. This is even more notable given 
that he is neither an heir to a political dynasty, a politician from a dominant caste group, 
nor a leader of national parties such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the 
Congress Party. There is no doubt that without considerable political skills, he would 
not have persisted in his office. 
Nitish Kumar’s great political sense lies in the fact that during his tenure of office, he 
has often shrewdly flip-flopped on major issues according to political circumstances. 
For example, his government at first eagerly promoted liquor sales to increase revenue 
from excise duties (Government of Bihar 2007: 218) before reversing and promising 
prohibition during a campaign for the State Assembly elections in 2015. After returning 
to power, despite an estimated annual loss of Rs 4,000 crore on excise revenue, his 
government enacted the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act to make Bihar a dry state in 
2016. It was commonly perceived that Nitish played the prohibition card to woo women 
voters across caste lines in the elections and thereafter1. 
It is also worth remembering that, while his party—the Janata Dal (United) 
[JD(U)]—has stayed in power in Bihar since November 2005, it has changed sides no 
less than three times. In June 2013, the JD(U) cut ties with the BJP, its longtime ally, 
because Narendra Modi was likely to be nominated as the BJP’s prime ministerial 
candidate for the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. In 2015, after the debacle of the general 
elections, the JD(U) joined with its archrivals, Lalu Prasad Yadav’s Rashtriya Janata Dal 
and the Congress Party, and the so-called Mahagathbandhan (Grand Alliance) won the 
State Assembly elections against the BJP and its allies. However, within 2 years Nitish 
had deserted the alliance and returned to the BJP to form a new coalition government. In 
the course of the political juggling, he has successfully retained the office of chief 
minister, except for the period between May 2014 and February 2015. 
The recent controversy over the Citizenship Amendment Act is another example. An 
editorial in The Hindu accused Nitish Kumar of “trying to run with the hare and hunt 
with the hounds” because he “impelled his party to support the Citizenship Amendment 
                                                   
1 In July 2018, the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act was amended, and some of its 
draconian provisions were diluted, including the arrest of all adult members of a family 
of an offender (section 32), enhanced punishment after previous conviction (section 53), 
and imposition of a collective fine on a group of people (section 64), among others. 
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Bill in Parliament and later called for a national debate on the issue.” It also made a 
scathing remark about his party’s “amorphous politics” not only in this particular case 
but in general, “Opportunism is easily forgiven, and often celebrated as pragmatism in 
politics, and the JD(U) has mastered it to perfection. The party has always been little 
more than a personal fiefdom of the Bihar Chief Minister…” (Hindu 2020). In other 
words, opportunism is an integral part of his political survival strategy.  
Whereas inconsistency is deeply embedded in the political behavior of Nitish Kumar 
and his one-man party, his regime has shown great consistency in one particular area 
since its inception: control of the media, especially via government advertisements. 
 
 
The Making of “Editor-in-Chief of Bihar” 
The Press Council of India (PCI) is a statutory body “for the purpose of preserving the 
freedom of the Press and of maintaining the standards of newspapers and news agencies 
in India” (Press Council Act, 1978). It consists of a chairperson, by convention a retired 
judge of the Supreme Court of India, and 28 other members who represent the press, the 
two houses of parliament and, the cultural, literal and legal fields. 
In 2013, the PCI released a 20-page report titled Pressure on Media in Bihar. The PCI 
report accused the Nitish Kumar government of unannounced censorship of the media 
in Bihar, comparing the situation to the Emergency (Press Council of India 2013: 6). 
Based on the findings of a three-member subcommittee, it illustrated that the state 
government had taken advantage of government advertisements as a means to pressure a 
wide range of media outlets. Specifically, it argued that in exchange for advertising buys, 
the media flattered the chief minister and shied away from publishing reports critical of 
the government. In line with this claim, the PCI report received little press coverage, as 
we will discuss later. 
A handful of news reports, all of which appeared in non-mainstream media, have 
corroborated the allegations of the PCI report (Hoot 2010, Jha 2012, Ray 2019). They 
briefly documented cases in which the government stopped advertising in newspapers 
that carried negative stories. In much the same vein, a PCI report on “paid news” quoted 
the late Prabhash Joshi, a noted Hindi journalist: “Every newspaper has made a 
calculation as to how much it would lose financially if it ever invited the ire of a chief 
minister. Some time ago I had been to Patna and happened to meet a newspaper owner 
during my visit there. He asked me to persuade (Bihar Chief Minister) Shri Nitish 
Kumar to help him by placing state government advertisements in his newspaper that 
had incurred a loss of Rs 73 lakh that month” (Press Council of India 2010: 22). Hence, 
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in the sense that the chief minister has enormous influence on news content, it seems 
quite reasonable to call him the “Editor-in-Chief of Bihar” (Jha 2012). 
During his tenure in office, the state government has become more organized and 
systematic in terms of abusing advertisements. It promulgated the Bihar Advertisement 
Policy 2008 and then replaced it with the Bihar Advertisement Policy 2016, centralizing 
the advertising and payment system2. Of central importance in this context is the 
Information and Public Relations Department (IPRD), Government of Bihar, via which 
all government advertisements pass for approval. The IPRD responsibility is to 
“publicize the classified advertisement, tender, information & other content … in the 
form of advertisements on Akashwani [All India Radio], Television, 
Newspaper/Magazine, Electronic Media, Internet etc.” and “ensure centralized 
monitoring and make payment for it” (Bihar Advertisement Policy 2016).  
Figure 1 presents the state government’s spending on advertisements and the actual 
expenditure of the IPRD. Government spending on advertisements was constant at 
around Rs 5 crore before Nitish Kumar came to power, but the state government has 
increased its spending on advertisements since 2007-08, amounting to Rs 133.5 crore in 
2018-19. Between 2006-07 and 2018-19, government spending on advertisements has 
grown nearly 25-fold, and its average annual growth rate was more than 30%. These 
numbers are quite staggering even after taking into account inflation. Accordingly, the 
IPRD’s expenditure has also grown exponentially over the past decade or so, although it 
accounted for just 0.12% of total expenditure in 2018-19. 
 
(Figure 1) 
 
However, there is a crucial external factor that has helped the state government’s 
carrot and stick approach. Bihar is still an economically backward state, and private 
commercial advertisements from local businesses are scarce. Moreover, most 
advertisements published in the Bihar edition are received from larger cities (e.g., Delhi, 
Mumbai, Kolkata, etc.). Thus, the media industry in Bihar (including the local editions 
of major newspapers) has depended heavily on state government advertisements for 
revenue. The situation seems to have worsened, considering that the press has suffered 
from declining readership and some national dailies have shut down local editions and 
bureau offices. In fact, The Telegraph launched the Patna edition in 2010, but it was 
closed in December 2016. According to Newslaundry (2018b), the Nitish government 
                                                   
2 See also the Bihar Advertisement Rules 2016. 
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gave fewer advertisements to The Telegraph because of its critical attitude toward the 
government. 
Sources had different answers to questions about what percentage of their bureaus’ 
total revenue came from state government advertisements, ranging from 30% to more 
than 50%. However, all of them agreed that the advertisements were financially 
important. For example, one of the local journalists I interviewed characterized state 
government advertisements as “oxygen to survive” for the media3. 
 
 
A Reciprocal Relationship through Government Advertisement 
In this section, we focus on one specific episode to illustrate the relationship between 
the media and the state government. This case is quite notorious among local journalists 
presumably because a senior journalist was ultimately forced to leave Bihar4. 
Dainik Jagran has been the most widely read newspaper in India, according to the 
Indian Readership Survey (IRS). In a recent round of the survey (IRS Q3 2019), the 
Hindi-language daily maintained its leading position in the market, recording an average 
issue readership (i.e., the number of readers who have read the paper the previous day) 
of 1.75 crores. Dainik Jagran, which “was gung-ho about understanding its reader, be it 
an adult or child” (Ninan 2007: 200), launched a regular supplement called Junior 
Jagran in its various editions across North India. This Hindi-English bilingual tabloid is 
targeted at the teenage segment, especially young readers who are inclined to read 
English newspapers rather than vernacular ones for academic and career needs. 
Although Junior Jagran is written and edited mainly by the National Bureau, some 
pages are allotted to each edition and their contents are localized5. 
On 22 January 2010, the Patna edition of Junior Jagran carried a biographical profile 
of Karpoori Thakur (1924-1988), a prominent figure in Bihar politics. Thakur, who was 
himself from a lower-caste background (a Nai community), was popularly identified as 
a leader of backward classes in Bihar. In the 1970s, he became the state’s chief minister 
to lead non-Congress governments twice, although both of his stints were short-lived 
(Kohli 1991, Singh 2015). Obviously, the Junior Jagran article titled “Profile: Karpoori 
Thakur” would be expected to serve its educational purposes, considering that it was 
                                                   
3 Interview with local journalist A (Patna, 22 February 2016). 
4 This section draws upon information from a dozen local informants, especially local 
journalist B, who was well-informed about the case discussed below. 
5 Neyazi (2011: 76-77) points out the contribution of supplements to the localization of 
a major Hindi newspaper. 
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written in English and dealt with the important historical figure. However, this was not 
the case. It was in fact an extremely bad example to young readers because the “author” 
of this article, who had a poor command of English, simply copy-pasted the Wikipedia 
page on Karpoori Thakur word for word, including several punctuation errors. To make 
matters worse, the person in charge of the Patna edition of Junior Jagran did not check 
this shoddy work and allowed it to be published. 
Shortly after its publication, the biographical sketch caused serious trouble for Dainik 
Jagran. However, this was not because the article plagiarized the Wikipedia entry, but 
because it contained some descriptions of Karpoori Thakur that would be quite 
offensive to those who were close to him. For example, it mentioned a rape allegation 
against him: “There are many stories of his colourful life like [Ram Manohar] Lohia. In 
1979, Premlata Rai, a 35-year old schoolteacher from Kathmandu, also accused Thakur 
of raping her while he was hiding in Nepal during the Emergency. She also complained 
that she was wrongfully confined when she visited Patna.” Moreover, the political 
legacy of Karpoori Thakur as a leader of lower castes was illustrated as follows: “He 
was a mentor to the prominent Bihari leaders such as Lalu Prasad Yadav, Ram Vilas 
Paswan, and Nitish Kumar. Most of the gunda [gangster] type of leaders of Bihar are 
treating him as their mentor.” Incidentally, the Wikipedia page on Karpoori Thakur has 
been edited many times, and the current version differs significantly from the one that 
the “author” of the Junior Jagran article plagiarized. For some reason, the quotations 
above do not appear on the page at the time of this writing6. 
Meanwhile, a girl in Samastipur district came across Karpoori Thakur’s biographical 
profile in Junior Jagran. She was a great-granddaughter of the former chief minister 
and, unsurprisingly, reported on the article to her grandfather, Ram Nath Thakur. He is a 
son of Karpoori Thakur and was then a JD(U) Member of Legislative Assembly that 
represented the Samastipur Assembly constituency. It was a remarkable coincidence that 
Ram Nath Thakur was the minister of the Information and Public Relations Department 
(IPRD) in the Nitish Kumar government at a time when “Profile: Karpoori Thakur” 
appeared in Junior Jagran. Allegedly insulted by this article, he took advantage of his 
position as the IPRD minister and decreased the number of Bihar government 
advertisements appearing in Dainik Jagran. 
                                                   
6  At https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Karpoori_Thakur&action=history, see 
the revision history of the Wikipedia page on Karpoori Thakur. Dated 30 November 
2009 was the last version of the Wikipedia entry before the biographical sketch 
appeared in Junior Jagran on 21 January 2010. It is available at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Karpoori_Thakur&oldid=328762549. 
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It is worth adding that although Ram Nath Thakur was not very powerful as an 
individual politician, he had the ministerial position and made such an arbitrary decision. 
About 10 months after this incident, the incumbent MLA and cabinet minister lost his 
seat to an unknown first-time candidate of the Rashtriya Janata Dal in the State 
Assembly elections, whereas the ruling JD(U)-BJP alliance won a landslide victory, 
gaining 206 of 243 seats (JD(U) 115, BJP 91). Several local journalists I interviewed 
agreed that Ram Nath Thakur had neither political influence nor followers, and that his 
only political asset was being a son of Karpoori Thakur. However, this was a great asset 
because major political parties still competed for Karpoori Thakur’s legacy to appeal to 
lower caste communities in Bihar (Hindu 2015). It therefore seemed likely that Ram 
Nath Thakur had gained the ministerial berth because of his family background. 
Similarly, it could also explain the fact that even after losing his seat in the Assembly 
election, he was nominated by the JD(U) as its Rajya Sabha candidate and became a 
Member of Parliament in April 2014. 
More importantly, this was supposedly not a typical case where the government 
abuses advertisement to make the media pliable. In fact, it was somewhat more 
complicated because, as one of my informants said, “It was the state government that 
surrendered to Dainik Jagran. It was not the other way around.”7 On 12 February, 3 
weeks after the Junior Jagran article was published, Dainik Jagran broke a story about 
a large-scale scam on the front page. This lead story alleged that senior officers of the 
chief minister’s secretariat as well as a JD(U) politician had been involved in corruption 
related to the contract of manufacturing and supplying liquor. It also charged that there 
had been a deliberate cover-up by the state government: 
 
In this matter, the Excise minister [Jamshed Ashraf] had already written a letter to 
the chief secretary. Moreover, he wrote a 9-page letter to the chief minister 
regarding no action taken about Rs 500 crore scam that had been flourishing over 
the past 4 years in the Excise Department. He had demanded a thorough enquiry by 
the Vigilance Department or principal accountant general. The state government is 
involved in a big conspiracy by covering up the matter by just transferring the 
excise commissioner on the notice of the Excise minister. 
 
By exposing the corruption scandal, the management of Dainik Jagran hit back at the 
state government, which had considerably decreased its number of advertisements over 
                                                   
7 Interview with local journalist B (Patna, 27 December 2019). 
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a period of weeks. This bold decision paid off. Soon after the story was released, Ram 
Nath Thakur contacted Dainik Jagran on Nitish Kumar’s orders to “sort out 
differences”. Within a few days after the two parties made a deal, state government 
advertisements to the Hindi newspaper picked up and returned to the level before the 
trouble over the Junior Jagran article. Meanwhile, following the initial revelation of the 
scandal, Dainik Jagran made no further investigation into it and even published an 
article that attempted “damage control” for the state government8. 
In fact, this was not the end of the story. In November 2010, shortly after the ruling 
JD(U)-BJP swept back into power in the State Assembly elections, a senior journalist of 
Dainik Jagran whose name appeared in the byline of the liquor scam article was 
transferred from Patna to Lucknow and then to New Delhi. An informant who was 
familiar with this incident said that if Nitish Kumar had not come back to power, this 
journalist would have not been transferred9. It is quite obvious that the management of 
Dainik Jagran had to pledge allegiance to Nitish Kumar, considering that he was likely 
to remain Chief Minister of Bihar and “Editor-in-Chief of Bihar” over the next 5 years.  
 
 
Quantitative Analysis of Government Advertisement 
The narrative presented in the last section clearly illustrates that the relationship 
between the government and the media was reciprocal rather than unilateral. It is based 
on interviews with a dozen local informants but it can be confirmed empirically using 
data on government advertisements10. 
Figure 2 compares the quantity of state government advertisements in the Patna 
edition of Dainik Jagran with that of Hindustan, the Hindustan Times’ sister publication 
and the most-read newspaper in Bihar 11. Moreover, Table 1 makes a comparison 
                                                   
8 Interview with local journalist B (Patna, 27 December 2019). 
9 Interview with local journalist B (Patna, 2 August 2018 and 27 December 2019). 
10 To collect the data used in the current and next sections, I accessed the newspaper 
collection held at the Gandhi Museum in Patna. It has the Patna edition of major 
newspapers, including Hindustan, Dainik Jagran, The Times of India, and the 
Hindustan Times. 
11 According to the Indian Readership Survey (IRS Q3 2019), the average issue 
readership of Hindustan and Dainik Jagran in Bihar was 4.3 lakhs and 3.2 lakhs, 
respectively. Dainik Bhaskar (1.8 lakhs) and Prabhat Khabar (1.8 lakhs), both of which 
are Hindi dailies, followed them. However, another survey conducted in 2018 obtained 
a different result: Hindustan was at the top, but Dainik Bhaskar pushed Dainik Jagran 
to the third position in the state. It also showed that no English newspapers figured in 
the top four most-read dailies in the state (Newslaundry 2018a). 
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between Dainik Jagran and Hindustan over a couple of 3-week periods, including one 
between 24 January and 14 February in 2010, during which the state government 
allegedly decreased its number of advertisements to Dainik Jagran. To measure the 
quantity of government advertisements in the newspapers, we use two metrics: (a) the 
number of government advertisements (regardless of size), and (b) the total area of 
government advertisements (in terms of full pages). 
 
(Figure 2) 
 
(Table 1) 
 
Comparing the leading Hindi dailies of the state can help us understand quantitatively 
the significance of Ram Nath Thakur’s decision to decrease the quantity of government 
advertisements in Dainik Jagran. This is because even though Dainik Jagran is alleged 
to have suffered from this arbitrary decision for about 3 weeks following the Junior 
Jagran article, the same was not the case with Hindustan. Thus, the quantity of 
government advertisements in Hindustan could give us a good sense of what the 
situation for Dainik Jagran would have been like if the state government had not 
decreased the quantity of government advertisements in Dainik Jagran. 
Figure 2 shows that although the quantity of government advertisements had been 
highly volatile, it had changed in a quite similar manner in Dainik Jagran and 
Hindustan, except from the end of January to the middle of February in 2010. During 
this period alone, Dainik Jagran had a consistently smaller quantity of government 
advertisements than Hindustan. Moreover, the timing at which the quantity of 
government advertisements diverged and then converged was also in line with the 
above-mentioned story. It is also clear from Table 1 that in contrast to Dainik Jagran, 
Hindustan had slightly more advertisements from January 24 to February 14 than before 
and after that period. On an average day, both newspapers carried more than 20 
government advertisements, amounting to nearly 3 pages. During the 3 months from 1 
January to 31 March 2010, the daily average number of pages was 27.7 and 29.5 in 
Dainik Jagran and Hindustan, respectively. This means that state government 
advertisements usually accounted for about 10% of total pages in the dailies. Had it not 
been for the Junior Jagran article, the percentage of government advertisements in 
Dainik Jagran would have likely been as high as that in Hindustan. 
In sum, the sudden divergence between the two Hindi dailies in the quantity of state 
government advertisements could be attributed to Ram Nath Thakur’s decision to 
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decrease the quantity of government advertisements in Dainik Jagran. At the same time, 
it is also worth noting that the state government did not completely discontinue 
advertisements in Dainik Jagran. A Patna-based journalist pointed out that in general, 
the state government decreases rather than halts advertisements to the media when it has 
a critical report. He explained that by doing so, the government tries to camouflage its 
pressure on the media and avoid creating a bad impression12. This observation is quite 
convincing, considering that Nitish Kumar is “a very sophisticated politician” and “a 
master of political subtlety.”13 On the contrary, however, all the informants except for 
this journalist said, referring to not only this case but others, “the state government 
stopped advertisements” for certain period of time. 
 
 
Media Coverage and the Government’s Version of the Truth 
If something inconvenient happens to the government, does the media report on it? If so, 
how does it deal with bad news for the government? These questions are relevant to 
understanding to what extent the media houses are under pressure and how they handle 
it. To shed light on these points, we analyze both qualitatively and quantitatively how 
the local editions of leading newspapers (two Hindi and two English dailies) covered 
three important incidents. 
The first case is the liquor scam, which we examined above. On 12 February 2010, 
Dainik Jagran reported on the allegation of the Rs 500 crore scam, which was based on 
a 9-page letter that Jamshed Ashraf, the Excise and Prohibition Minister, handed over to 
Nitish Kumar. The Chief Minister categorically denied all the accusations raised and, a 
week after the initial report of Dainik Jagran, Jamshed Ashraf was fired from the post 
for his “irresponsible behavior” (i.e., leaking the secret letter to the media and levelling 
false allegations). In the end, although the opposition demanded investigation of the 
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the state government was swift to close the case, 
concluding that it found no irregularities. 
The second case is the release of the PCI report, which we briefly mentioned in the 
first section. In February 2012, during the lecture at Patna University, PCI Chairman 
Justice Markandey Katju accused Nitish of manipulating the media for his own benefit. 
He also announced that the PCI would constitute a fact-finding team to probe the matter. 
A year later, some of the members raised a series of technical issues to hinder its release 
                                                   
12 Interview with local journalist C (Patna, 31 August 2019). 
13 Interview with local journalist A (Patna, 14 February 2017). 
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at the last minute but the report compiled by the fact-finding team was leaked before the 
PCI officially approved it14. On 13 February 2013, a web portal called the Bihar Times 
reported on the leaked document earlier than the major newspapers (Bihar Times 2013). 
The Bihar Times has never received government advertisements due to its critical stance 
on the state government15. Nitish claimed that the PCI report was utterly baseless and 
biased. He also attacked Katju and even suggested that the leak of the report was 
politically motivated. Members of the ruling parties also questioned the legitimacy of 
the “draft report” which was yet to be approved by the PCI. 
The third case is the Srijan scam, in which government funds worth Rs 1,500 crore 
were diverted to the accounts of an non-governmental organization based in Bhagalpur 
district, Srijan Sahyog Mahila Samiti, from 2007 to 2014. Srijan was founded by 
Manorama Devi and managed by her son Amit Kumar and daughter-in-law Priya 
Kumar after her death in 2016. The scam had not come to light until August 2017, when 
it was detected by the district magistrate. On 9 August, Chief Minister Nitish Kumar 
made public the alleged embezzlement of the funds, and the state government later 
ordered a CBI probe into the case. Notwithstanding the scale of the scam, although the 
“small fish” (managers and employees of banks, lower-level government officials, etc.) 
were caught immediately, neither senior bureaucrats nor politicians have been arrested 
so far. More surprisingly, an arrest warrant was issued for Amit and Priya soon after the 
scam became publicly known, but the two remain at large. 
Table 2 shows the extent of media coverage of these three cases in the four major 
newspapers using two measures: the number of related articles and their total area. The 
data covers 2 weeks from the day after the news was publicly released. A couple of 
points are clear from Table 2 and the collection of newspaper articles on which it is 
based. 
 
(Table 2) 
 
First, there was very little press coverage of the PCI report. In total, the four 
newspapers carried only nine articles related to the PCI report. Among them, one article 
was placed on the front page and the others were relegated to inside pages. Moreover, 
these articles focused largely on claims made by the government and rarely referred to 
                                                   
14 Interview with the late Arun Kumar, who worked for The Times of India (Begusarai, 
31 October 2013). He was an 11th term member of the PCI and part of the 
three-member subcommittee. 
15 Interview with Ajay Kumar, Editor of the Bihar Times (Patna, 24 December 2019). 
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the report itself, as their headlines clearly indicate. They include “Report about media 
suppression in Bihar doesn’t get clearance” (Dainik Jagran, 19 February), “Katju, don’t 
try to be a Congress agent: Sanjay Jha” (Hindustan, 19 February), “Justice Katju has 
dialed wrong number, says Nitish” (Hindustan Times, 21 February), among others. Thus, 
it seems that the major dailies tried to downplay the news and minimize damage to the 
state government. 
In fact, it is also suspected that they attempted to divert public attention from the PCI 
report by mixing it up with another issue. A couple of days after the PCI report was 
leaked, Katju contributed an essay to the Hindu arguing strongly that Narendra Modi 
was not a suitable candidate for Prime Minister (Katju 2013). This naturally provoked 
severe criticism from the BJP, and Arun Jaitely (Leader of the Opposition in the Rajya 
Sabha at that time) and Katju had a heated exchange. Interestingly, in the Patna editions 
of the major newspapers, the war of words over Modi was covered slightly better than 
the PCI report in terms of both the number of articles (ten to nine) and the total area of 
articles (1,712 cm2 to 1,359 cm2). This is selection bias in news coverage, considering 
the relative importance of the two issues for readers in Bihar. 
It is also worth mentioning that the major newspapers did not conduct their own 
investigations into the serious allegations against the state government, let alone launch 
campaigns. The Srijan scam received so much press coverage that all of the dailies 
reported on the case every day for 2 weeks, but their reporting relied solely on sources 
affiliated with the police and the CBI. This would have been fine if the CBI probe had 
been exhaustive. However, one Patna-based journalist said that the CBI probe on the 
Srijan scam was “sloppy”, and another local journalist who had delved into the case said 
that the CBI was “so hostile” to him16. They suspected that the CBI protected politicians 
of the ruling parties and senior government officials who were involved in the Rs 1,500 
crore corruption, which echoed what some articles suggested (Deccan Herald 2018, 
Telegraph 2018). Moreover, Sagar (2020a, 2020b) pointed out that the CBI protected 
politicians and IAS officers involved in another case related to a shelter home in 
Muzaffarpur, Bihar. Incidentally, Brajesh Thakur, the main culprit of this scandal, 
owned a dubious newspaper and kept receiving government advertisements (Ray 2019). 
Comparing media reports on the Srijan scam with those on the fodder scam under the 
Rashtriya Janata Dal government, veteran journalists pointed out that despite pressure 
from the government, the press exposed corruption and ran ahead of the CBI in the 
                                                   
16 Interviews with local journalists C and D (Patna, 31 August 2019). 
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fodder scam case17. Accordingly, it is clear that the leading newspapers only scratched 
the surface of the Srijan scam. Presumably, this was not only because the CBI was 
under political pressure but because the media played it safe to avoid provoking the ire 
of the chief minister. In a similar vein, neither did they carry out investigation into the 
liquor scam. 
These observations together strongly suggest that if something inconvenient 
happened to the state government, the media would report on it only to the extent that it 
never insulted the powers that be, especially the “Editor-in-Chief of Bihar”. Otherwise, 
it would lose revenue from government advertisements. More specifically, to minimize 
damage to the government, the media was most likely to either play down the bad news 
for the government, just scratch the surface with no investigation, or even propagate the 
government’s version of the truth. Moreover, the case of the PCI report vindicates a 
number of critical comments on the Indian press, quoted in Auletta (2012): “In India, 
the print media doesn’t write about itself” (Sevanti Ninan), and self-criticism in the 
established press is “almost like an omertà” (Jonathan Shainin). 
 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has shown both qualitatively and quantitatively that the Nitish Kumar 
government has taken advantage of government advertisements and exerted enormous 
pressure on the media to report on the government’s version of the truth. In Bihar, 
private commercial advertisements from local businesses are scarce, and the media 
depends heavily on government advertisements for revenue. It is against this backdrop 
that the media has shrewdly avoided important issues that are inconvenient to the 
powers that be and, thus kept people in the dark. Nevertheless, although the government 
has had the upper hand, it is not only the media in the state but also the chief minister 
who has needed government advertisements for survival. He needs advertisements to 
overcome his political weakness, especially lack of solid constituencies and effective 
party machinery to mobilize popular support. 
This paper focuses exclusively on the case of Bihar under the Nitish Kumar 
government, but it is commonly perceived that the central and state governments abuse 
advertisements across India. In June 2019, for example, it was reported that the Modi 
government cut off advertisements to at least three major newspaper groups in 
                                                   
17 Interviews with local journalist D (Patna, 31 August 2019) and Ajay Kumar (Patna, 
24 December 2019). 
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retaliation for unfavorable reports (Reuters 2019)18. For the past few years, moreover, 
Kashmir has become the focus of attention in this regard (Dev 2019, Mir 2019, Raafi 
2019). This serious threat to the Indian democracy is expected to grow further, given the 
commercialization of the media, linkages between politics, business and the media, and 
declining newspaper readership (Auletta 2012, Dev 2018, Guha Thakurta 2012). 
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Sources : Actual expenditure of the Information and Public Relations Department is from
the website of the Finance Department, Government of Bihar (http://finance.bih.nic.in/).
Government spending on advertisements is from Hoot (2010), Jha (2012) and Ray (2019),
which are based on information obtained by filing Right to Information applications.
Figure 1: Government spending on advertisements and expenditure of the
Information and Public Relations Department (Rs. crores)
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Figure 2: The quantity of government advertisements in Dainik Jagran  and Hindustan
(a) Number of government advertisements
(b) Total area of government advertisements (in terms of full pages)
Source : Data collected by the author on the state government's advertisement in the Patna edition
of the two newspapers.
Note : Some issues were not found in the newspaper collection that the author accessed. For
Dainik Jagran , issues March 1, 2, 12 and 24 were missing. For Hindustan, issues February 27,
and March 1 and 2 were missing. Neither of the newspapers relaesed an issue on January 27
because that was the day after Republic Day. The figure does not include these dates, for which at
least one of the newspapers was missing.
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Dainik Jagran Hindustan Dainik Jagran Hindustan
From Jan 3 to Jan 23 22.0 22.1 2.5 2.7
From Jan 24 to Feb 14 11.0 25.0 1.4 3.2
From Feb 15 to Mar 10 22.2 22.7 2.8 2.5
The entire period 2.3 2.8
(From Jan 1 to Mar 31) (8.5%) (9.5%)
Note : See Figure 1. The numbers in parentheses are average shares of government advertisements in
the newspapers over the 3 months.
Table 1: Government advertisements during different 3-week periods
(a) Number of government
advertisements
(b) Total area of government
advertisements (in terms of
full pages)
18.6 22.7
Source : Data collected by the author on state government advertisement in the Patna edition of the
two newspapers.
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Hindi newspapers
    Dainik Jagran 13 2,667 3 240 30 7,398
    Hindustan 16 1,589 3 600 34 10,868
English newspapers
    The Times of India 7 973 2 365 18 4,114
    Hindustan Times 9 2,540 1 154 25 5,832
Total 45 7,769 9 1,359 107 28,212
Table 2: Media coverage of unfavorable events to the state government  
Source : Data collected by the author on newspaper articles in the Patna edition of the four newspapers.
Note : The data cover the 2 weeks following the day after the news came out, namely, from 13 to 26 February
2010 for the liquor scam, from 13 to 26 February 2013 for the PCI report, and from 10 to 24 August 2017 for the
Srijan scam. None of the newspapers was issued on 16 August 2017 because it was the day after
Independence Day. Instead, 24 August was added.
(1) Liquor scam (3) Srijan scam
Number
of articles
Total area
of articles
(㎠)
Number
of articles
Total area
of articles
(㎠)
(2) PCI report
Number
of articles
Total area
of articles
(㎠)
 
 
